Omni Ekonomi

Mattias Magnusson

Universal

Ekonomipriset till Nobels minne

Paul Robert Milgrom (born April 20, 1948) is an American economist. He is the Shirley and Leonard Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University, a position he has held since 1987. Milgrom is an expert in game theory,  specifically auction theory and pricing strategies. He is the co-creator of the no-trade theorem with Nancy Stokey. He is the co-founder of several companies, the most recent of which, Auctionomics, provides software and services that create efficient markets for complex commercial auctions and exchanges.
He is the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics of 2020 together with Robert B. Wilson.
Milgrom and his thesis advisor Robert B. Wilson designed the auction protocol the FCC uses to determine which phone company gets what cellular frequencies. Milgrom also led the team that designed the 2016-17 incentive auction, which was a two-sided auction to reallocate radio frequencies from TV broadcast to wireless broadband uses.

Paul Milgrom

Robert Butler "Bob" Wilson, Jr. (born May 16, 1937) is an American economist and the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus at Stanford University. He is known for his contributions to management science and business economics. His doctoral thesis introduced sequential quadratic programming, which became a leading iterative method for nonlinear programming. With other mathematical economists at the Stanford Business School, he helped to reformulate the economics of industrial organization and organization theory using non-cooperative game theory. His research on nonlinear pricing has influenced policies for large firms, particularly in the energy industry, especially electricity.



Robert B. Wilson

The winner's curse is a phenomenon that may occur in common value auctions, where all bidders have the same (ex post) value for an item but receive different private (ex ante) signals about this value and wherein the winner is the bidder with the most optimistic evaluation of the asset and therefore will tend to overestimate and overpay. Accordingly, the winner will be "cursed" in one of two ways: either the winning bid will exceed the value of the auctioned asset making the winner worse off in absolute terms, or the value of the asset will be less than the bidder anticipated, so the bidder may garner a net gain but will be worse off than anticipated. However, an actual overpayment will generally occur only if the winner fails to account for the winner's curse when bidding (an outcome that, according to the revenue equivalence theorem, need never occur).The winner’s curse phenomenon was first addressed in 1971 by three Atlantic Richfield  petroleum engineers, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell who published the seminal work "Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations" in the Journal of Petroleum Technology. who claimed that oil companies suffered unexpectedly low returns “year after year” in early Outer Continental Shelf oil lease auctions.  Outer Continental Shelf auctions are common value auctions, where value of the oil in the ground is essentially the same to all bidders.

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